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Abstract
For practical automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems,
replay attack poses a true risk. By replaying a pre-recorded
speech signal of the genuine speaker, ASV systems tend to be
easily fooled. An effective replay detection method is there-
fore highly desirable. In this study, we investigate a major dif-
ficulty in replay detection: the over-fitting problem caused by
variability factors in speech signal. An F-ratio probing tool is
proposed and three variability factors are investigated using this
tool: speaker identity, speech content and playback & recording
device. The analysis shows that device is the most influential
factor that contributes the highest over-fitting risk. A frequency
warping approach is studied to alleviate the over-fitting prob-
lem, as verified on the ASV-spoof 2017 database.
Index Terms: replay attack, spoofing countermeasures
1. Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that most biometric authentification
systems are vulnerable to spoofing attacks, and anti-spoofing
has become a serious focus of researchers as early as in the
1990s. Among various biometric authentification methods, au-
tomatic speaker verification (ASV) using speech signals is par-
ticularly interesting. Firstly, speech signals are easy to collect,
which makes ASV suitable in a very wide range of applica-
tions, especially in remote scenarios; secondly, speech inter-
face is easy to use and less intrusive, hence applicable to people
in most circumstances; thirdly, ASV is an active authentifica-
tion (i.e., requires users’ active response) thus naturally robust
against spoofing.
Nevertheless, researchers indeed found some spoofing at-
tacks which are dangerous to ASV systems, including imper-
sonation, speech synthesis, voice conversion, and replay [1]. In
the past few years, a multitude of research on anti-spoofing has
been conducted, mainly concentrated on attacks by synthetic
speech and converted speech [2, 3]. Less has been done for at-
tacks by replayed speech, i.e., speech recorded from the genuine
speaker and replayed by an imposter during the authentification.
Ironically, recording & replay presents a more practical risk
compared to speech synthesis and conversion, as it requires nei-
ther specific expertise nor sophisticated equipments: a mobile
phone is enough. Some research has demonstrated that the low-
effort replay attack may cause a much higher false-acceptance
rate than voice conversion and speech synthesis which often re-
quire complicated skills and much more effort [4]. In this year,
the ASV-Spoof 2017 challenge [5] put its focus on replay at-
tack, which may invoke more interest in this area.
In this study, we investigate how the replay detection is so
difficult. Our hypothesis is that this difficulty can be largely
attributed to the intermingling of the distortion caused by the
recording & replay process and some other variability factors in
speech signals, including speaker identity, speech content and
playback & recording device. To test this hypothesis, we pro-
pose to use the F-ratio metric as a probing tool to analyze the
impact of variability factors. The analysis shows that device
is the most influential factor: the F-ratio patterns are very dif-
ferent among different devices, which will significantly reduce
the generalizability of replay detection models, leading to high
risk of over-fitting. To alleviate this problem, a frequency warp-
ing approach is studied. The key idea is to emphasize on the
most discriminative frequencies while deemphasizing the fre-
quencies that are less discriminative but impacted by the varia-
tion of devices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses some related work on replay attack and countermea-
sures, and Section 3 describes the ASV-Spoof database we used
in the study. Section 4 presents the variation analysis using the
F-ratio probing tool, and Section 5 presents the replay detection
results. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. Related work
An early work related to replayed speech in ASV research was
conducted by Villalba and colleagues [6]. They investigated the
vulnerability of ASV systems with far-field replayed speech.
Using an ASV system based on joint factor analysis (JFA), they
reported an increase in the equal error rate (EER) from 1% to
almost 70% when real-time speech of imposters was replaced
by replayed speech of genuine speakers. The same authors later
showed that it was possible to detect such replay attack by mea-
suring the difference of channels with and without replay [7].
Alegre et al. [4] re-assessed the risk of replay attack to ASV.
They conducted the experiments with six ASV systems using
the large and standard NIST corpus. Their results showed that
the low-effort replay attack posed a significant risk on all the
tested ASV systems, and the state-of-the-art i-vector/PLDA sys-
tem was the most vulnerable.
Shocked by the real threat from replay attack, researchers
have carried out a number of studies in recent two years. Wu
et al. [8] evaluated the vulnerability of text-dependent ASV
systems under replay attack using a standard benchmarking
database, and also proposed a replay detection technique to
safeguard the verification system. The key idea of the detec-
tion algorithm was to match the input signal with some previ-
ously stored speech samples based on a similarity metric. An-
other replay detection approach was proposed by Villalba and
colleagues [9]. They assumed that a far-field recorded speech
signal would involve more noise and reverberation, which, as a
consequence, would result in a flattened spectrum and reduced
modulation indexes within the signal. Following this assump-
tion, they designed several features that were argued to be suit-
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able for detecting far-field replayed speech.
Previous studies have confirmed that replay attack is a gen-
uine risk to ASV systems, and some replay detection methods
have been proposed with certain success. However, our knowl-
edge to the properties of replayed speech remains limited, and
the replay detection is still difficult.
3. ASV-Spoof Database
The ASV-Spoof database, which was released for the ASV-
Spoof 2017 challenge, was used in our experiments. The full
database contains three subsets: training set, development set
and evaluation set. The database is primarily based on the re-
cent text-dependent RedDots corpus [10] and its replayed ver-
sion [11]. It contains 10 common phrases, and the recording
was conducted with different playback & recording devices.
The sampling rate is 16 kHz and the sample precision is 16 bits.
As the ground truth of evaluation set has not been published,
we just use the training and development set in our experiments.
Table 1 presents more details of the database.
4. Variation analysis by F-ratio
The difficulty of replay detection is multiple, but a particular
difficulty may be in the fact that the spectral distortion caused by
the recording and replay process is intermixed with the multiple
variability factors in speech signals, such as speaker identity,
speech content and playback & recording device. This inter-
mixing means a replay detection model trained in one condition
would be unsuitable for other conditions, i.e., over-fitting. This
is particularly the case if the training data is limited and thus the
variation of the variability factors can not be fully covered. We
will testify this hypothesis in this section.
4.1. F-ratio probing tool
In order to test the factor-mixing hypothesis, the F-ratio met-
ric [12] is used as a probing tool to test the impact of the vari-
ability factors. The usage of F-ratio is because it directly relates
to the detection task, so the analysis results are more valuable
for feature and model design.
F-ratio is a simple frequency-domain weighting approach
where the weight of a frequency band is determined by its dis-
criminative capability for the task in hand. In speaker recogni-
tion, this technique has been used in feature design, i.e., pro-
moting the most significant frequency bands in the front-end
pipeline [13]. In our study, the F-ratio values can be used to
investigate which frequency bands are more capable to separate
genuine (real-time) and replayed speech.
Formally, suppose the spectrum of the speech signal is di-
vided intoM filter banks (Fbanks). The F-ratio value of the i-th
Fbank is defined as the ratio of the between-class distance and
the within-class variance of this Fbank values of all the frames,
where the classes are genuine speech (Cg) and replayed speech
(Cr). This is formulated as follows:
Fi =
(µgi − µri )2
1
Ng
∑
xi∈Cg (xi − µ
g
i )
2 + 1
Nr
∑
xi∈Cr (xi − µri )2
where xi represents the value of the i-th Fbank of the speech
frame x, and µgi and µ
r
i are the means of xi of all the frames of
the genuine speech class and the replayed speech class, respec-
tively. Ng and Nr are the number of frames of the two classes.
The F-ratio values [F1, F2, ..., FM ] form an F-ratio pattern.
This pattern will be heavily used in this paper to analyze the
properties of replayed speech. The simplest usage of the F-ratio
pattern is to discover which frequency bands are most discrimi-
native for detecting replayed speech; more importantly, the vari-
ation of the F-ratio patterns caused by a particular variability
factor will reflect the impact of the factor to replay detection in
generalizability.
4.2. Variation analysis by F-ratio probing
In this section, we use the F-ratio pattern as a probing tool to
investigate the impact of variability factors in the replay detec-
tion task. Three factors are considered: speaker identity, speech
content and playback & recording device. The experiment is
conducted on the development set of the ASV-Spoof database
because it contains more playback & recording devices than the
training set.
In each of the experiments, we select one of the three fac-
tors as the probed factor. By choosing every value of the probed
factor and drawing the F-ratio patterns for all of them, we can
check the variation of the F-ratio patterns caused by this fac-
tor. The results are shown in Figure 1, where the three plots use
(a) speaker identify (Speaker ID), (b) speech content (Phrase
ID), (c) playback & recording device (Device ID) as the probed
factor, respectively. In each experiment, the frequency axis is
linearly divided into 23 Fbanks (with equal bandwidth), and
the pattern for each value of the probed factor is presented as
a curve in the corresponding plot of Figure 1.
Figure 1 (a) and (b) reveal two important messages:
Firstly, the most discriminative information resides in the high-
frequency bands; secondly, the F-ratio patterns are rather simi-
lar in spite of the values of the speaker identity and the speech
content. If we regard the F-ratio pattern as a simple model,
this similarity means that a model trained in one condition of
speaker or speech content is suitable for data in other condi-
tions. In other words, the variations of speaker and speech con-
tent do not impact model generalizability.
Figure 1 (c) delivers more interesting information. From
this plot, we observe very different F-ratio patterns with dif-
ferent playback & recording devices. This indicates that with
individual devices, the discovered F-ratio patterns are rather
device-dependent, or, in other words, not generalizable. This
also implies serious over-fitting in model training (with features
derived from the Fbanks), since discriminative information dis-
covery and usage is general to all classification models. Note
that the weak generalizability of replay detection models has
been noticed and warned by the organizers of the ASV-Spoof
2017 challenge.
4.3. Compensation by frequency warping
The analysis of the pervious section suggests that a major dif-
ficulty in replayed detection is the weak generalizability of
features/models caused by the variation of devices. A pre-
processing that can reduce this variation will help improve
model generalizability and the performance of replay detection.
A key observation from Figure 1 is that in these three plots,
the high-frequency bands show great discriminative capabil-
ity. Particularly in Figure 1 (c), the discrepancy of F-ratio pat-
terns with different devices is mostly in the low- and middle-
frequency bands. This means that if we can emphasize the
high-frequency bands, then the device-related variation may be
largely reduced, while most discriminative power still remains.
We use the frequency warping approach to achieve the goal.
In this approach, the frequency axis is firstly warped by a non-
linear function, and then the Fbanks are designed on the warped
Table 1: Data Profile of ASV-Spoof database
Database No. of Spks Playback Devices Recording Devices No. of Genuine Utts. No. of Spoofed Utts.
Training 10 3 1 1,508 1,508
Development 8 6 7 760 950
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Figure 1: F-ratio patterns on linear Fbanks.
frequencies. A famous warping approach is the Mel warp-
ing, which emphasizes on low-frequency bands by ‘stretching’
the frequency axis in the low-frequency area and ‘compress-
ing’ it in the high-frequency area. This leads to the popular
Mel Fbanks (M-Fbanks). Since our goal is to emphasize the
high-frequency bands, we study an inverted Mel warping func-
tion [14] to achieve the effect, which leads to a new design of
Fbanks denoted by IM-Fbanks. For a clear presentation, the
original (linear) Fbanks without any frequency warping is de-
noted by L-Fbanks. The forms of three warping functions are
illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The forms of three warping functions.
4.4. Probe M-Fbanks and IM-Fbanks
We apply the F-ratio probing tool to test the variations caused by
the three variability factors with M-Fbanks and IM-Fbanks, fol-
lowing the same process in Section 4.2. The results are shown in
Figure 3, where the first row presents the results with M-Fbanks,
and the second row presents the results with IM-Fbanks.
It can be seen that with the M-Fbanks (emphasizing on low
frequencies), the device-related variation becomes more signif-
icant, while with the IM-Fbanks (emphasizing on high frequen-
cies), the variation is largely reduced. This variation reduction
is highly important for building models that can be well gen-
eralized during test. These results double confirmed our anal-
ysis that the most discriminative information for replay detec-
tion is within high-frequency bands and the variation of devices
mostly impacts the low-frequency bands. By emphasizing on
high-frequency bands (as in IM-Fbanks), the variation can be
reduced while keeping the discriminative power.
4.5. Probe training and development sets
In the last experiment of this section, we study the discrep-
ancy between the training and development sets using the F-
ratio probing tool. The results are shown in Figure 4, where the
F-ratio patterns are computed from both the training and devel-
opment sets, using each of the three types of Fbanks. It can be
observed that the F-ratio patterns on the two sets are quite dif-
ferent, indicating that models trained on the training data may
be not generalizable well on the development data. Interest-
ingly, the F-ratio patterns of the two sets with the IM-Fbanks
are much closer when compared to those with the other two
types of Fbanks. This means that the IM-Fbanks can improve
model generalizability.
5. Replay detection
This section utilizes these three Fbanks to conduct replay detec-
tion. We firstly present the classifiers used in the experiment,
and then report the detection results.
5.1. Classifiers
We experiment with three classifiers: GMM, i-vector/SVM, and
DNN. GMM is a pure generative model and DNN is a pure
discriminative model. I-vector/SVM is a combination of the
two types of models. In general, generative models are more
generalizable than discriminative models, while discriminative
models are more powerful if the class boundary is complicated.
For the DNN model, we use the 23-dimensional Fbanks
as the input feature. While for the GMM and i-vector/SVM,
a discrete Fourier transform (DCT) is applied to form a 13-
dimensional cepstral feature, and then plus its first order deriva-
tives, resulting in 26-dimensional feature vectors. For the M-
Fbanks, this results in the standard Mel-frequency cepstral co-
efficients (MFCC). Following the name convention, the cepstral
feature derived from the L-Fbanks is denoted by LFCC, and the
one derived from the IM-Fbanks is denoted to be IMFCC.
5.1.1. GMM system
For the GMM system, we first train two GMMs, one for genuine
speech (denoted by λg) and one for replayed speech (denoted by
λr). During test, a sequence of feature vectors X are presented
to the two GMMs, and the log likelihood ratio Λ(X) is used to
make the genuine/replay decision, where the likelihood ratio is
defined as follows:
Λ(X) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
{logp(xi|λg)− logp(xi|λr)}.
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Figure 3: F-ratio patterns on M-Fbanks and IM-Fbanks.
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Figure 4: F-ratio patterns on the training and development sets.
5.1.2. i-vector/SVM system
For the i-vector/SVM system, an i-vector model is firstly trained
using the training data, including both genuine and replayed
speech. This model is then used to extract the representations
of all the training utterances, and this representation is a low-
dimensional continuous vector which is called i-vector. Once
the i-vectors of all the training utterances are ready, an SVM
model is trained for genuine/replay classification.
During test, the input utterance is embedded into an i-vector
using the i-vector model, and then the SVM model is applied to
determine whether the utterance is genuine or replayed.
5.1.3. DNN system
The DNN model used in this experiment consists of a two-
layers convolutional neural network (CNN) for frame-level fea-
ture extraction and a time-delay neural network (TDNN) for
frame-level classification. During test, given an input utterance,
the posteriors for the genuine and replay classes are computed
frame by frame, and then these posteriors are averaged to pro-
duce an utterance-level posterior, which is then used for gen-
uine/replay decision making.
5.2. Replay detection results
We built three replay detection systems as described above us-
ing the training data, with three features (MFCC, LFCC, IM-
FCC). The detection results in terms of equal error rate (EER)
on the development set are shown in Table 2.
It can be observed that on the ASV-Spoof database, the IM-
FCC is the most effective. This is expected as IMFCC leads to
less over-fitting, according to the results of the F-ratio variation
analysis. When comparing different models, the best perfor-
mance is obtained with the simple GMM model. For DNN,
although the results seem acceptable, but we found the model is
not reliable: different initialization will result in rather different
results, and some are quite poor. This can be explained by the
potential over-fitting we discussed during the variation analysis,
and the fact that complex models are more prone to over-fitting.
Table 2: EER(%) results on replay detection with different fea-
tures and classifiers. ‘GMM(Diag)’ means GMM with diag-
onal covariance; ‘GMM(Full)’ means GMM with full covari-
ance; ‘SVM(Rbf)’ means SVM with RBF kernel; ‘SVM(Linear)’
means SVM with linear kernel.
System MFCC LFCC IMFCC
GMM(Diag) 24.87 13.42 8.85
GMM(Full) 23.55 12.37 7.50
i-vector + SVM(Rbf) 28.82 17.37 9.34
i-vector + SVM(Linear) 26.32 17.37 10.92
CT-DNN 16.45 8.16 8.29
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we used the F-ratio metric as a probing tool to an-
alyze the impact of various speech factors to replay detection.
Our analysis showed the most discriminative information for
replay detection resides in high-frequency bands; moreover, the
playback & recording device contributes the most variation in
F-ratio patterns, hence the most significant over-fitting risk. A
frequency warping approach was studied to alleviate the varia-
tion caused by devices, and significant performance gains were
obtained. Future work involves better frequency compensation
methods and analysis for between-dataset discrepancy.
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